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This paper studies the impact of bank mergers on firm-bank lending relationships using information 
from individual loan contracts in Belgium. We analyse the effects of bank mergers on the probability 
of borrowers maintaining their lending relationships and on their ability to continue tapping bank 
credit. The environment reflects a number of interesting features: high banking sector concentration; 
“in-market” mergers with large target banks; importance of large banks in providing external finance 
to SMEs; and low numbers of bank lending relationships maintained by SMEs. We find that bank 
mergers generate short-term and longer-term effects on borrowers' probability of losing a lending 
relationship. Mergers also have heterogeneous impacts across borrower types, including borrowers 
of acquiring and target banks, borrowers of differing size, and borrowers with single versus multiple 
relationships. Firms borrowing from acquiring banks are less likely to lose their lending relationship, 
while target bank borrowers are more likely to lose their relationship. Firms borrowing from two of 
the merging banks are less likely to lose their relationship than firms borrowing from only one of the 
merging banks or firms borrowing from nonmerging banks.  
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The impact of bank mergers on firm borrowers has been a topic of interest for 
researchers and policy makers for a number of years. Two questions of general 
concern have been raised: Do bank mergers harm or benefit bank borrowers? Do bank 
mergers result in less credit for small firms? (For an overview see Berger et al., 1999.) 
In many countries banks are the most important providers of external finance to firms. 
Banks are especially important for small and medium size firms, as they represent 
these firms' principal source of external finance.  
 
Consolidation in banking sectors in countries around the world has motivated the 
recent focus on the impacts of bank mergers. Belgium is no exception in this regard. 
A wave of bank mergers during the past decade has decreased the total number of 
banks operating in Belgium and has increased banking sector concentration. In this 
paper we use data on firm-bank loan contracts from the Belgian credit register to 
analyse the impact of bank mergers on the bank lending relationships of small and 
medium size firms (SMEs). Although the literature on the impact of bank mergers on 
borrowers is growing, very few studies to date have made use of firm-level data.  
 
Investigations that have relied on firm-level data to study the effects of bank mergers 
have been undertaken for two other countries: Italy (see Bonaccorsi di Patti and 
Gobbi, 2003; Chionsini et al, 2004; Sapienza, 2002; Panetta et al, 2004) and Norway 
(Karceski et al, 2004).
1 Like ours, the Italian studies use credit register data and focus 
on SMEs.
2 In contrast, Karceski et al use data on Norwegian firms’ stock market 
returns to study the effects of bank mergers on borrowers; therefore, their focus is on 
large, listed firms.   
 
The context of our analysis  differs in a number of ways from the settings of the 
existing studies. First, concentration in the Belgian banking sector has increased 
significantly and is now very high as a result of a number of "in-market" bank 
mergers. Second, unlike Italian SMEs, Belgian SMEs generally maintain low 
                                                 
1 Scott and Dunkelberg (2003) address bank mergers in the US also using firm-level data. 
2 Banks must report to the Belgian credit register information relating to total exposures above € 
25.000.  The reporting requirement for the Italian credit register is about € 75.000.  
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numbers of bank lending relationships, which actually appears to be more typical of 
SMEs in other countries than the mean number of nine lending relationships reported 
by Sapienza (2002) for Italian SMEs. Third, large banks are very important in lending 
to SMEs in Belgium. Finally, the mergers that we study all involve large target banks, 
as well as the more typical feature of large acquiring banks. 
 
We tackle some new questions, in addition to investigating questions that o ther 
authors have addressed. Among the questions that have been studied in other papers 
are the following. Is the probability of losing a bank lending relationship higher for 
borrowers of merging banks than for borrowers of nonmerging banks? Are particular 
borrowers affected more by mergers than others (e.g., small vs. large firms; borrowers 
of acquiring vs. target banks)? How are merger effects spread out over time? Do 
mergers affect the interest rates offered to continuing borrowers?
3  
 
New questions that we address include: Are borrowers of both merging banks affected 
differently by mergers than borrowers of only one of the merging banks? Are 
borrowers with single bank relationships affected differently than borrowers with 
multiple relationships? Informational gains from combining the assessments of two 
banks may imply that borrowers of both merging banks are affected differently by 
mergers than borrowers of only one of the merging banks. This effect may be large in 
the Belgian context, as the number of lending relationships maintained by firms is 
low. Firms with single relationships can be expected to have lower bargaining power 
(or higher switching costs) than firms with multiple relationships; therefore, single-
relationship borrowers of merging banks may benefit less from (or be harmed more 
by) bank mergers.  
 
The economic literature in general and the banking literature in particular has argued 
that mergers produce efficiency gains but also increase market power (for an 
overview on bank mergers, see Focarelli et al, 2002). Can we expect that market 
power effects are more important than efficiency gains? Sapienza’s (2002) results on 
loan rates for firms continuing to borrow from the merged bank after the merger  
                                                 
3 Although we are not able to address this question directly, part of our ongoing work involves using data on 
changes in loan volumes to make some inferences about interest rates.  
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suggest that market power effects may dominate for “in-market” mergers. The 
question remains as to whether the same conclusion holds with respect to termination 
of bank lending relationships.   
 
Previous studies have found that bank mergers have heterogeneous impacts on 
borrowers with  differing characteristics. In particular, small firm borrowers of 
merging banks appear to face additional difficulties in tapping credit in the short run 
following a merger. Also, borrowers of target banks (especially small target banks 
when the acquiring bank is large) appear to be harmed more by mergers. Karceski et 
al (2004), however, highlight the observation that target bank borrowers with lower 
switching costs are less harmed than those with higher switching costs. 
 
The structure of the Belgian banking market, where large banks were important in 
granting loans to small firms even before the mergers, might suggest that  other 
studies' findings of stronger merger effects for small firms than for large firms will 
not hold for our analysis. In addition, the fact that the target banks are large may 
suggest less of a difference in the effects of bank mergers on borrowers of acquiring 
vs. target banks. On the other hand, the low number of bank lending relationships 
maintained by Belgian firms and the high proportion of firms with single lending 
relationships suggest that bank mergers might be expected to have stronger effects in 
Belgium than in countries where firms maintain many bank lending relationships.  
 
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, we find that bank mergers have 
short-run effects, in that firms borrowing from merging banks are significantly less 
likely to see their lending relationship terminated than otherwise similar borrowers. 
Longer-term effects, however, suggest that single relationship firms borrowing from 
one of the merging banks may become more likely to lose their lending relationship, 
although firms borrowing from both merging banks are still less likely to have the 
relationship terminated in the longer term. Second, when we differentiate between 
borrowers of target and acquiring banks, we find that borrowers at target banks are 
more likely to lose their relationship, whereas borrowers from acquiring banks are 
less likely to terminate their relationship following a merger. In addition, t hese 
differential effects begin to appear immediately following the merger, and they 
become more robust in the longer run. These results on the different effects of  
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mergers on target and acquiring bank borrowers are according to what organizational 
theory would suggest and what has been reported in previous empirical research. One 
difference, however, is that our result relating to borrowers of acquiring banks appears 
to be stronger than results found elsewhere. A third result is that the effects of mergers 
differ for small and large firms and also vary for large firms borrowing from acquiring 
banks compared with large firms borrowing from target banks. Results also differ for 
target bank borrowers with single versus multiple lending relationships. Finally, firms 
borrowing from several of the merging banks are less likely to lose their relationship 
with the consolidated bank than are firms borrowing from only one of the merging 
banks or firms borrowing from nonmerging banks. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature 
and formulates hypotheses concerning the effects of bank mergers. Section III 
describes the banking environment and discusses sources of data. Section IV presents 
the results of regressions testing the impact of mergers. Section V concludes. 
 
II. Effects of bank mergers: literature review and hypotheses 
 
A growing literature investigates the impact of financial consolidation on lending to 
small and medium size firms. However, as argued in the introduction, only a few 
papers analyze the impact of bank mergers using individual bank-borrower data. In 
this section, we first develop a number of testable hypotheses concerning the impact 
of bank mergers on individual firm-bank lending relationships. To do this, we draw 
on theoretical and empirical literature, which provides predictions concerning the 
potential effects of mergers (see e.g. Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein, 2002; 
Farinha and Santos, 2002; or Sapienza, 2002). Afterwards, we review the literature on 
bank consolidation and small-business lending. In Section IV we test the hypotheses 
on Belgian bank mergers. 
 
Are firms able to maintain or improve their bank relationships when banks 
consolidate? Which firms are more likely to be affected by bank mergers? How is 
borrower welfare modified after mergers? Are firms borrowing from several merging 
banks affected differently? The answers to these questions are related to the 
underlying forces for bank mergers themselves. Bank mergers should be initiated to  
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maximize shareholder wealth, but often other forces related to agency problems may 
be at the origin of such mergers. Increases in shareholder value arise from two 
potential sources: efficiency and market power.   
 
We start with a general discussion of the potential impacts of bank mergers in terms 
of efficiency and market power and conclude with a specific hypothesis concerning 
the impact of mergers on the termination rate of firm-bank relationships. Then, we 
elaborate on some modifications of this standard tradeoff between efficiency versus 
market power, and formulate a second hypothesis on the impact of financial 
consolidation on the rate of termination of firm-bank lending relationships that deals 
with different groups of firms. 
 
II.1 Efficiency versus market power 
 
A first impact of bank mergers is that they can lead to efficiency gains (for an 
overview on the impact of bank mergers, see Focarelli et al, 2002). Efficiency gains 
typically result from economies of scale, implying lower costs and/or higher revenues. 
These efficiency gains then are potentially passed on to customers. Examples of cost 
reductions are reductions in branch overlap, or savings on fixed costs. Efficiency 
gains leading to lower loan rates imply that borrowers are more likely to continue 
borrowing from the consolidated bank.  
 
Mergers, however, also yield increased market power. The gains in market power 
hinge on the structure of banking markets, including characteristics like market 
concentration, barriers to entry related to informational incumbency advantages, 
informational gains of bank mergers, and other potential costs to firms in switching 
banks. Gains in market power allow consolidated banks to charge higher loan rates. 
Sapienza (2002) further develops these arguments by looking at different “types” of 
mergers. In particular, she argues that the efficiency and market power effects depend 
on the market overlap and the degree of competition among the merging banks prior 
to the consolidation. “In-market” mergers should allow a greater increase in market 
power and thus facilitate cooperation among banks (see Salant et al, 1983; Bernheim 
and Whinston, 1990; but for opposite predictions see Mester, 1987). At the same time, 
“in-market” mergers permit the realization of greater cost savings than “out-of- 
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market” mergers. In sum, if the market power effect outweighs the efficiency effect, 
loan rates should increase or vice versa. Based on these insights, we formulate 
Hypothesis 1: 
 
Hypothesis 1: When efficiency gains outweigh the effects of increased market power, 
firm-bank lending relationships are less likely to be terminated, and merging banks 
are more likely to attract new borrowers. Conversely, when market power outweighs 
efficiency gains, firm-bank relationships are more likely to be terminated, and 
consolidated banks are less likely to attract new borrowers. 
 
II.2 Borrower heterogeneity: Modifications of the trade-off between efficiency versus 
market power 
 
Are all firms equally affected by bank mergers? Which borrowers are likely to gain 
and which borrowers are expected to lose from bank mergers?  Karceski, Ongena and 
Smith (2004) review the heterogeneous impacts of bank mergers on borrower welfare, 
highlighting modifications to the previously discussed trade-off between efficiency 
and market power.  
 
A first distinction is related to differences between borrowers at acquiring versus 
target banks. Do firms borrowing from acquiring banks exhibit different rates of 
termination of lending relationships than firms borrowing from target banks? First, 
borrowers of target banks will be harmed when the target bank was previously 
granting below cost loans. Merger-related increases in loan rates and loan denials then 
can be expected at the target bank. Second, borrowers at target banks are hurt more 
than borrowers of acquiring banks when the merged bank adopts the strategic focus 
and the organizational structure of the acquiring bank (Peek and Rosengren, 1996; 
Houston et al, 2001). The adoption of the “rules” of the acquiring bank then may hurt 
the target bank’s borrowers, as these are less likely to adhere to the new rules. 
Moreover, soft information available at the target bank may melt down when key 
employees are more likely to leave the merged bank or move within the new 
organization. In sum, we may expect that target bank borrowers are more likely to 




Are large borrowers differently affected than small borrowers by a bank merger? This 
question is related to the issue of the “size effect of lending”. Stein (2002) argues that 
the hierarchical structure of banks yields a size effect of lending. Larger banks and 
branches are more complex financial institutions and may have a different 
organizational structure than small banks. Large banks concentrate on larger firms, 
and reduce the amount of lending to small businesses (see also Strahan and Weston, 
1998, and Peek and Rosengren, 1996). This may be driven by the fact that: (1) 
servicing large versus  small firms is entirely different (relationship versus 
transactional lending; also see Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995)); or (2) small banks 
have a better technology for servicing small firms (see also Cole et al, 2003, and 
Udell,   1989). This implies that if larger banks reduce the supply of credit to small 
borrowers, small borrowers may be more likely to lose their relationships. 
Alternatively, it is possible that small banks are intrinsically less efficient. In this case 
merged banks would become larger and better able to service small firms, which 
would imply that smaller borrowers would not face a higher probability of having 
their relationship with the bank terminated. 
 
Some theories also point to a heterogeneous impact related to the magnitude of 
“borrower switching costs”. These switching costs determine whether it is 
advantageous for firms to switch banks, or whether they are locked-in. In the event of 
switching, borrowers face “informational” switching costs and “transactional” 
switching costs (see e.g. Bouckaert and Degryse, 2004; Degryse and Ongena, 2004; or 
Kim et al, 2003; Klemperer (1995) provides a review).
4 These costs may be 
heterogeneous across firms. Whereas firms with low switching costs may leave the 
merged bank if interest rates rise as a result of the merger or if other banks start to 
actively poach borrowers from merged banks, firms with high switching costs will 
typically stay with the bank. Thus, whether or not borrower welfare is harmed when 
the lending relationship is dropped after  a merger hinges on the importance of 
switching costs and whether firms can find financing alternatives. Switching costs are 
presumably positively related to the degree of “informational opacity”. We can expect 
                                                 
4 “Informational” switching costs stem from the fact that an inside bank possesses an informational 
advantage vis-à-vis outside banks. Firms willing to switch banks might be perceived of lower quality 
and therefore pay a higher loan rate. “Transactional” switching costs refer to higher costs that are 
incurred in visiting another bank. Examples of the latter are differences in geographical convenience, 
paperwork, different standards at banks etc.  
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that larger firms, more profitable firms and firms having more tangible assets will 
have less problems in credibly communicating their value to other financiers. 
Switching costs may also be expected to be lower for firms with multiple lending 
relationships rather than single relationships.   
 
Finally, are firms borrowing from two merging banks treated differently from firms 
borrowing from only one of the merging banks? A bank merger decreases the number 
of firm-bank relationships mechanically for firms borrowing from at least two of the 
merging banks. If firms have previously chosen an optimal number of relationships, 
then firms being hit by this drop in relationships may face incentives to increase their 
number of relationships again. Most likely this would imply that firms will be less 
inclined to drop their relationship at the consolidated bank.
5 This force would not be 
present for firms borrowing from only one of the merging banks.
6  
 
Another important argument leading to differences between firms borrowing from one 
versus several of the merging banks is linked to the informational effects of mergers. 
Panetta et al. (2004) argue that when considering firms borrowing from several 
merging banks, the consolidated bank should be able to better tailor interest rates to 
the firm's riskiness. The reasoning is that consolidation improves bank’s informational 
abilities in discriminating among low- and high quality borrowers. How does this 
“information pooling” between merging banks impact the probability of severing a 
relationship? The pooling of information provides the consolidated bank with a more 
precise signal about firms borrowing from both merging banks. This provides the 
consolidated bank with an additional information advantage. It allows banks to stop 
lending to non-creditworthy borrowers and to continue lending to its most 
creditworthy borrowers.  
                                                 
5 Admittedly, in a world without frictions, firms could simply choose to substitute the two merging 
banks with two other banks. 
6 Also the consolidated bank has incentives to revisit the position of the firms. For example, it may 
force out very large firms as the entire exposure to the firm may exceed certain limits. As our focus is 
on SMEs, we expect that this argument is not at play.  
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On the other hand, based on informational hold-up arguments, outside banks bidding 
for borrowers having loans with two of the merging banks now face increased adverse 
selection problems yielding the consolidated bank additional market power (see e.g. 
Hauswald and Marquez, 2003; or von Thadden, 2004). This informational gain is only 
present for firms borrowing from several of the merging banks and not for firms 
borrowing from only one of the merging banks.  
 
The above arguments suggest that the different potential forces do not all point in the 
same direction. We nevertheless tentatively conjecture that firms initially borrowing 
from two or more of the merging banks are less likely to have the lending relationship 
at the consolidated bank terminated than firms borrowing from only one of the 
merging banks.  
 
We can summarize the above discussion by the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Bank mergers may have heterogeneous effects on lending relationships 
of firms with different characteristics. Relationships are more likely to be terminated: 
 
a) at target banks than at acquiring banks,  
b) for small firms than for large firms, 
c)  by firms with lower switching costs  than by other firms 
d) for firms borrowing from only one, rather than both merging banks. 
 
II.3. Results from previous empirical studies 
 
There is a growing empirical literature dealing with the effects of bank mergers on 
borrowers. Due to lack of detailed micro-data, however, most studies rely on 
aggregate bank balance sheet data to infer the impact of bank mergers. The main 
findings of this approach are that merged banks seem to turn more towards larger 
borrowers and drop small borrowers. However, other external providers of finance 
seem to “fill the gap” over time by offering loans to small firms.
7  
 
                                                 
7 Examples are Berger and Udell (1996), Peek and Rosengren (1996), and Strahan and Weston (1998). 
A review is provided in Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999).  
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As we have already noted, only a few studies examine the impact of bank mergers on 
individual borrowers using firm-level data. One important source of data for these 
studies has come from the Italian credit register. Sapienza (2002) uses this data source 
to study the effects of Italian bank mergers borrowers' credit lines.
8 In particular, 
Sapienza investigates how borrowers' loan rates evolve after bank mergers, and also 
whether mergers induce termination of lending relationships. She finds that loan rates 
decrease after bank mergers, suggesting evidence for an efficiency effect of mergers. 
However, this efficiency effect is offset by a market power effect: loan rates increase 
following mergers when the market share of the acquiring bank is substantial. With 
respect to the effects of mergers on the termination of lending relationships, Sapienza 
finds that mergers raise the probability of termination but that target banks in mergers 
are more likely to terminate lending relationships than are acquiring banks. Indeed, 
the effects of mergers on the termination rates of lending relationships for borrowers 
of acquiring banks appear to be very small. Also, the effect of target banks' higher 
termination rates is stronger for small target banks than for large target banks. Finally, 
small borrowers tend to be more strongly affected by the increased probability of 
termination due to mergers than are larger borrowers.
9  
 
Chionsoni, Foglia and Marullo-Reedtz (2004) also rely on Italian credit register data 
to study bank mergers and find that borrowers that are kept on at merged banks have a 
lower probability of default than other borrowers in the population. Panetta, Schivardi 
and Shum (2004) deal with loan pricing after Italian bank mergers. They argue that 
bank mergers should improve the merged bank’s informational abilities to 
discriminate between low- and high-quality borrowers. These gains may come from 
an improvement in the bank’s ability to process an information set, or through pooling 
of information for firms borrowing at several merging banks. These authors indeed 
find that after a merger, the relation between the default probability of a firm and its 
loan rate becomes steeper, suggesting that mergers do improve i nformation. 
Moreover, Panetta et al. (2004) investigate whether firms borrowing from both  
 
                                                 
8 Sapienza chooses credit lines because these are nonsecured lines, which enables her to compare 
interest rates across borrowers without having to take into account collateral. 
9 Note, however, that termination of a lending relationship in this context represents the more narrow 
concept of a drop of a credit line.   
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merging banks are affected differently than firms only borrowing from one of the 
merging banks. They find that the informational gains are not driven by the explicit 
pooling of information, as the increase in the slope of the link between risk and 
interest rates is the same for firms borrowing from one merging bank only and for 
those that were borrowing from both of the merging banks.  
 
A final paper dealing with bank mergers and relationship termination is that of 
Karceski, Ongena and Smith (2004), which uses data on publicly listed Norwegian 
companies. They estimate the impact of bank mergers on borrower’s stock prices and 
link bank mergers to termination rates of  relationships. They find that smaller 
borrowers of target banks are hurt. Overall, this suggests that the welfare of borrowers 
may be influenced by a strategic focus that favors acquiring borrowers. They also find 
that bank mergers increase the relationship termination rates of borrowers at target 
banks but not at acquiring banks.
10  
 
III. Banking environment and description of data 
 
In this section we describe the Belgian banking environment, the number of bank 
lending relationships maintained by Belgian SMEs, and the data sources for our 
analysis. We first document the increase in banking sector concentration arising from 
bank mergers and the importance of large banks in lending to small firms in Belgium. 
We then point to the low number of bank lending relationships maintained by Belgian 
SMEs and a decline in the number of lending relationships over time. Finally, we 
discuss the sources of data used in our empirical analysis and provide summary 
statistics for the firms and banks in our sample. 
 
III.1 Banking environment and bank-firm lending relationships 
 
Concentration in the Belgian banking sector has steadily increased over the past 
decade and is currently quite high. A small number of large banks now accounts for a 
high percentage of banking sector assets, deposits, and loans. Table 1 documents a 
                                                 
10 Scott and Dunkelberg (2003) investigate for the US, using the 1995 National Federation of 
Independent Business data, the effect of bank mergers on a firm’s attempt to obtaining financing. They 
find that the incidence of a merger raises the frequency of searching for a new bank.   
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decline over time in the number of banks for all bank size categories. This table also 
shows that the current number of large banks is low. The decline over time in the 
number of banks is due in part to several mergers and acquisitions that have occurred 
over the past decade. Indeed, every large bank currently operating in the Belgian 
banking sector has been involved in some type of merger or acquisition in the past ten 
years. 
 
Table 1: Number and size distribution of banks 
 operating in Belgium 
 
  1993  1996  1999  2002 
Small  72  69  59  56 
Medium  63  58  49  48 
Large  15  13  9  6 
Total  150  140  117  110 
 
Large banks are defined as having assets exceeding 10 billion  
€ (in 2002 values); medium banks have assets between 500 
million and 10 billion €.  
 
The graph below, which depicts Herfindahl indices over time for assets, deposits, and 
loans in the Belgian banking sector, illustrates the increase in concentration that has 
occurred in each of these areas. The increases in these indices between 1997 and 2002 
reflect effects of the mergers that we analyse in this paper. Banks accounting for 
roughly 58 percent of banking sector assets in 1997 were involved in mergers 
between 1997 and 2002. 
 




















Source: Bank balance sheet data  
13 
Table 2 shows the time variation in the four-bank concentration ratios of loans to 
firms reported in the credit register. The market shares are reported for all firms taken 
together, as well for different size categories, as defined in the Basel II accord 
(corporates, corporate SMEs and retail SMEs).
11 This table reveals that the share of 
large banks in loans to firms has increased for all size categories, including the 
smallest firms. The market share of the f our largest banks in loans to small and 
medium size firms is now very high.  
 





  Dec-97  Dec-98  Dec-99  Dec-00  Dec-01  Dec-02 
All firms  58,0  66,4  78,5  77,2  79,0  83,5 
Corporate  49,9  55,4  68,00  71,3  69,3  81,5 
Corporate 
SME  54,4  64,3  79,5  76,2  80,5  85,2 
Retail SME  71,4  78,3  84,9  84,2  84,3  86,7 
Source: Credit register. 
 
As a point of comparison, Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) report the average three-
bank concentration ratios based on total assets in different countries over the period 
1989-1996. They find that the three largest banks account for 49 percent in Belgium, 
15 percent in the US, 24 percent in Italy, 27 percent in Germany, and 50 percent in the 
United Kingdom. Of course, in countries like the US or Italy, banks concentrate their 
activities in specific geographic areas, implying that some local markets are also 
highly concentrated in these countries.
12 Nevertheless, the evidence by Cetorelli and 
Gambera (2001) illustrates that the Belgian market was already quite concentrated 
before the starting date of our sample.  
 
Table  3 presents summary statistics on the number of bank lending relationships 
maintained by Belgian firms in 1997 and in 2003, again broken down by Basel II size 
                                                 
11 Corporates are defined in the Basel II accord as firms with greater than 50 million Euro in annual 
sales; SMEs have sales below 50 million Euro. (Subject to national discretion, the Basel Committee 
allows substituting the value of assets for sales when the latter is unavailable.) In addition, retail SMEs 
are those SMEs for which the total exposure of any single banking group to the firm is less than 1 
million Euro.  
12 Sapienza (2002) reports that in 1994, 49 Italian provinces had a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHII) 
in between 0.10 and 0.18, and 29 provinces had an HHI greater than  0.18.   
14 
category. From this table we observe that the average number of bank lending 
relationships for all firms taken together is low, although the number of lending 
relationships increases with firm size.
13 The average number of bank lending 
relationships for firms in each size category has declined over time.
14  
 
Table 3 Numbers of firms and numbers of bank relationships 
 by Basel size category
 
 
  N   Mean  Median  Min   Max 
Std. 
dev. 
1997             
Total  100 432  1,30  1  1  16  0,70 
Corporate  904  3,31  3  1  15  2,44 
Corporate SME  5 397  2,02  2  1  16  1,29 
Retail SME  94 131  1,24  1  1  7  0,54 
             
2003             
Total  122 904  1,21  1  1  9  0,53 
Corporate  997  2,30  2  1  9  1,42 
Corporate SME  6011  1,72  1  1  9  0,95 
Retail SME  115 896  1,17  1  1  5  0,45 
Source: Credit register 
 
III.2 Data sources and summary statistics 
 
We rely on three sources of data for our analysis: 
(1) Data from the credit register, which contains information on loans to Belgian 
firms granted by banks operating in Belgium. Our data cover the period 1997-
2003 and contain both authorised and utilised volumes by type of loan by 
bank. The banks represented in the data include all foreign and domestic banks 
operating in Belgium which either authorised or had outstanding loans during 
the period to non-financial firms. Loans to Belgian firms that were extended 
                                                 
13 Belgium is not an exception in this respect. For example, results for France indicate that about 60% 
of firms having sales of less than € 2.5 million have one bank lending relationship (Dietsch and 
Golitin-Boubakari, 2002, credit register data for 2000). In Portugal, about 57% of the firms has a 
unique relationship (Farinha and Santos, 2000, credit register data for 1995).  
14 Although we present data for only the first and last years of our period, data for the intermediate 
years confirm a steady decline in the average number of lending relationships across all size categories 
of firms. For example, the average number of lending relationships for all firms in each of the years 
1998-2002, respectively, are: 1,28; 1,26; 1,25; 1,23; 1,22. In previous work (see Degryse et al, 2004), 
we have investigated the determinants of the number of firm-bank relationships for the years 1997 and 
2002. The determinants were quite stable over time, suggesting that other structural changes in the 
financial sector may explain the drop in the number of relationships over time.   
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by foreign banks or branches outside of Belgium are not included in the data 
set. Also, the credit register contains no data on interest rates or collateral.  
(2) Firm balance sheets. These data come from firms' annual balance sheet filings 
during the period 1994-2002. Small and medium-size firms in Belgium are 
allowed to file a short balance sheet form, which is less complete than the long 
form required for large firms. Hence, certain data such as sales and number of 
employees (for which reporting is voluntary on the short form) are not 
available for all firms. As a result, we rely on the book value of assets as a 
measure of firm size, rather than number of employees or sales. 
(3) Bank balance sheets. These contain annual balance sheet data, which banks 
are required to report under the Supervisory Reporting Scheme (Schema A). 
These data are available from 1992-2003 
 
While the credit register data offer a unique source of information relating to firms' 
bank lending relationships and loan volumes, the limitations of these data suggest 
some restrictions and caveats for our analysis. Most importantly, because the credit 
register data include only banks operating on Belgian territory and thus exclude 
foreign banks operating outside of Belgium, it is possible that the number of bank 
relationships for large firms is understated in these data. If large Belgian firms borrow 
from foreign banks that are not located in Belgium, then those relationships will not 
be captured in the data. This suggests restricting our attention to small and medium 
size firms.  
 
In all of the analysis that follows, we have excluded all firms that meet the Basel II 
classification as "corporate" (i.e., with sales exceeding 50 million €), as well as all 
firms with assets exceeding 500 million €.
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The credit register data include information on authorised loan volumes and on actual 
borrowing (utilised loan volumes). We rely on utilised volumes for our analysis, on 
                                                 
15 The Belgian economy has a large number of coordination centers. These are generally subsidiaries of 
international firms that have been established in Belgium to benefit from tax advantages. They carry 
out activities for other group entities such as centralization of accounting, administration, and financial 
transactions. Because coordination centers do not behave like typical firms, they have also been 
excluded from our regression analysis.  
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the assumption that bank lending relationships are more likely to be valuable to firms 
to the extent that lending actually occurs.    
 
We construct a panel consisting of observations of firm-bank lending relationships in 
December of each of the years 1997-2003. The firms included in the panel are those 
SMEs that had at least one bank lending relationship in December, 1997. These firms 
are included for every year of the panel (unless the relation is terminated, in which 
case the observation disappears). Because we are interested in observing the effects of 
mergers on firms that were borrowing from merging banks prior to the merger, we 
exclude from the panel all firms that entered into the credit register data after 
December, 1997.  
 
The table below presents summary statistics for the firms and banks in our panel.  
 
Table 4. Panel summary statistics: firm and bank characteristics 
 
Summary statistics for firms are based upon all firm-year observations included in the panel data 
analysis, which consists of yearly observations from Dec., 1997-Dec., 2003. Bank summary statistics 
are based upon all bank-year observations included in the panel. Firm and bank asset values are in 
thousands of  € (2002 values). All variables definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
 
   N  Mean  Median  Std. Dev. 
          
Firm 
characteristics         
AGE  472.109  11,65  11,96  10,27 
ASSETF  472.109  1 752   498   8 954 
ROAF (*)  472.109  5,97%  5,37%  10,86% 
LEVERAGE(**)  472.109  75,12%  74,85%  38,67% 
          
Bank 
characteristics         
ASSETB  500  8 808 294  810 957  30 219 522  
ROAB  500  0,16%  0,25%  1,51% 
BADLOANSB  500  1,95%  0,92%  3,21% 
OPCOSTB  500  8,77%  6,66%  6,78% 
LIQB  500  10,83%  13,05%  39,07% 
 (*) Firms with ROA > 99 % and < - 99% are excluded. 
(**) Firms with Debt/Equity > 1000 % are excluded. 
 
The median firm has an age of about 12 years; 498.000 € of total assets; a return on 
assets of about 5.4%; and a leverage – defined as the book value of debt over assets – 
of 75 percent. The bottom panel of Table 4 presents the bank-year characteristics.  
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Table 5 reports summary statistics on firm characteristics for different groups of firm-
bank relationships: firms borrowing from an acquiring bank in a merger (but no other 
bank involved in the merger); firms borrowing from a target bank in a merger (but no 
other bank involved in the merger); firms borrowing from both the acquiring and a 
target bank in a merger; those borrowing from nonmerging banks. This table indicates 
few differences in the characteristics across groups. Firms borrowing from target 
banks are slightly younger than other firms.  Also, firms borrowing from the acquiring 
and target banks in a merger are older and larger than other firms; however, their 
profitability (ROAF) and leverage (LEVERAGE) are similar to the values for firms in 
other groups. 
 
Table 5 Summary statistics for acquiring and target bank borrowers 
Summary statistics for firms are based upon all firm-year observations included in the panel data 
analysis, which consists of yearly observations from Dec., 1997-Dec., 2003. Assets are in thousands of 
€ (2002 values). All variables definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
 
   Mean  Median  Std. Dev. 
        
Firms borrowing from acquiring bank 
AGE  10,59  10,56  10,11 
ASSETF  1588  504  7825 
ROAF (*)  5,75%  5,26%  10,80% 
LEVERAGE(**)  75,03%  75,21%  37,40% 
        
Firms borrowing from target bank 
AGE  8,40  9,00  9,35 
ASSETF  1638  339  10 006 
ROAF (*)  5,79%  5,46%  11,51% 
LEVERAGE(**)  78,13%  77,59%  41,28% 
       
Firms borrowing from both  target and acquiring banks 
AGE  14,36  13,98  13,81 
ASSETF  6691  1347  21 523 
ROAF (*)  6,10%  5,21%  8,27% 
LEVERAGE(**)  72,80%  74,78%  24,12% 
       
Firms borrowing from nonmerging banks 
AGE  11,86  11,90  10,27 
ASSETF  1758  500  8954 
ROAF (*)  6,01%  5,37%  10,85% 
LEVERAGE(**)  75,04%  74,70%  38,77% 
(*) Firms with ROA > 99 % and < - 99% are excluded. 
(**) Firms with Debt/Equity > 1000 % are excluded.  
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IV. Empirical Analysis for Belgium 
 
In this section we test the hypotheses developed in Section II. The general question 
motivating our analysis is whether firms borrowing from merging banks are affected 
by the merger. In essence, this question asks not only whether borrowers of merging 
banks are treated differently from borrowers of banks not involved in mergers but also 
whether borrowers of merging banks are treated differently by the merged bank than 
they were by the individual (merging) banks prior to the merger.  Investigation of 
several specific questions helps to provide an answer. Do borrowers of merging banks 
face a higher probability of losing their lending relationships than borrowers of non-
merging banks? How are any merger-related effects spread out over time? Are 
dissimilar borrowers affected differently; e.g. borrowers of target vs. acquiring banks, 
borrowers of two (or more) of the merging banks, borrowers of different sizes, 
borrowers with single versus multiple lending relationships prior to the merger. 
 
As described in Section II, banks accounting for 58% of assets in the Belgian banking 
sector have been involved in "in-market" mergers between 1997 and 2002. We focus 
our analysis on three major bank mergers that occurred during this period, as these 
mergers are covered by the 1997-2003 panel for which we have data from the credit 
register. Each of these mergers involved at least two large banks.
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We present two complementary empirical approaches for investigating merger effects. 
First, we perform a panel regression analysis, which allows us to identify “combined” 
effects of the mergers, to control for time effects, to control for merging bank 
behavior prior to the merger, and to differentiate short-term versus longer-term 
merger effects. Second, as a robustness check and to identify any heterogeneity across 
mergers, we run regressions for each merger individually.  
 
IV.1 Panel regression specification 
 
Our basic regression specification is a logit-regression, where the dependent variable 
DROPPED is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm loses its 
                                                 
16 One merger involved a large target as well as a medium size target. Large banks are defined as those 
having asset values exceeding 10 billion € (in 2002 values). A number of mergers of smaller banks also 
occurred during this period; however, these mergers involved banks with only a very small number of 
firms in our sample.  
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relationship with the bank during the twelve-month period following the time of the 
observation.  
 
We estimate the following logit specification:  
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where each observation represents a firm-bank relation and where ikt DROPPED  equals 
one if during the twelve months following time t firm i lost its relationship with bank 
k. The variables  kt MERG1  and  kt MERG2  are dummy variables that allow us to 
identify firms that were borrowing from banks involved in a merger.  kt MERG1  is a 
dummy variable which equals one if bank k was involved in a merger in the twelve 
months following time t and if firm i was not borrowing from any of the other banks 
involved in the merger.  kt MERG2  is a dummy variable equal to one if bank k was 
involved in a merger in the twelve months following time t and  firm i was borrowing 
from, in addition to bank k, at least one of the other banks involved in the merger. 
These two variables allow us to distinguish the effects of mergers for firms borrowing 
from only one of the merging banks versus firms that were borrowing from two or 
more of the merging banks. 
 
Because each of the three mergers covered by our panel occurred roughly in the 
middle of a year, using observations in December in each year for the panel allows us 
to measure the “short term” merger effects as those occurring  in a twelve-month 
period around the merger, including six months following the merger. That is, if a 
merger occurred in June, 1998, the value of  kt MERG1  (together with DROPPED) for 
t=December, 1997 indicates whether the firm borrowing from one bank involved in 
the merger lost its relationship or not with the merged bank in the six months 
following the merger. 
 
To investigate “longer-term” effects of mergers, we introduce the dummy variables 
1 1 - kt MERG  and  1 2 - kt MERG , which are defined similarly to the short run merger 
variables but which equal one when firm i was borrowing from one or two merging 
banks at time  t-1 (and when the merger occurred between time  t-1 and  t),  
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respectively.
17 These dummy variables capture t he effects of mergers during the 




We include firm and bank control variables in the logit regression, as well as industry 
and year dummies. As firm controls we include measures of firm age, size, 
profitability, leverage, and year of most recent filing of balance sheet. The motivation 
for the particular firm control variables comes from previous merger literature and the 
literature on the determinants of number of relationships (see e.g. Farinha and Santos, 
2002; Detragiache et al, 2000; Ongena and Smith, 2000), as well as our own estimates 
with Belgian data (see Degryse et al, 2004). Older, larger and more profitable firms 
may have lower switching costs in that more public information is available about 
them. Leverage is introduced to control for certain demand factors. We expect that 
more levered firms are less likely to lose a lending relationship. However, firms that 
are too highly levered (e.g., financially distressed firms) may be more likely to lose a 
relationship. In the same spirit we introduce the year of most recent balance sheet 
filing. We suspect that halting the filing of balance sheets is one of the steps on the 
way to a firm's exit, either through bankruptcy or voluntary liquidation. 
 
We also include bank control variables in our specification, the motivation for which 
comes from the fact that the merger decisions may be correlated with bank specific 
characteristics.
19 Bank controls include measures of size, profitability, cost efficiency, 
bad loans, and liquidity. All variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. Year 
and industry dummies are introduced to control for business cycle effects and industry 
effects, respectively. 
 
The results of the regression for our basic specification are displayed in Table 6. We 
report regressions separately for all firms, for firms with a single bank relationship, 
                                                 
17 For the example of the June, 1998 merger the variable MERG1kt-1 would equal one for the observation 
t = Dec., 1998 for firms that had been borrowing from the merging bank in Dec., 1997. 
18 The short duration of our panel, combined with the large proportion of banking assets involved in 
mergers, prevents us from estimating the effects of mergers over a longer period following the merger. 
19 To our knowledge, the motivations for the three mergers were not related to bank distress.  
Moreover,  (unreported) summary statistics for the acquiring and target banks for variables reported in 
Table 4 are in line with the values for other banks in the sample, with the exception of size; the 
merging banks all have asset values greater than the 75th percentile value for all banks in the sample.  
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and for firms with multiple bank relationships.
20 The motivation for looking at the two 
subsamples – single relationships and multiple relationships – stems from potential 
differences in switching costs and availability of alternative sources of finance. Firms 
with multiple relationships may have more bargaining power with respect to the 
merged bank.   
 
Table 6: Panel regressions: impact of mergers on lending relationships  
The dependent variable in each regression equals one if during the following year firm i loses its relationship with 
bank k. The reported coefficients are logit estimates of a marginal change in the independent variable on the 
probability of losing the lending relationship. All regressions include a constant term, firm industry dummies, and 
year dummies (not reported). Definitions of the variables are provided in Section III. *, **, *** denotes 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1%-level, respectively (based on heteroskedastic-robust standard errors). 
 
PANEL  A  
Without merging bank fixed effects 
B 
With merging bank fixed effects 
  Sample  Sample 
  All  Single rel.  Multiple rels.  All  Single rel.  Multiple rels. 
             
Firm controls             
ln(AGEF)  -0,002***  0,003***  -0,009***  -0,002***  0,002***  -0,009*** 
ln(ASSETF)  -0,020***  -0,028***  -0,012***  -0,021***  -0,029***  -0,013*** 
ROAF  -0,080***  -0,076***  -0,077***  -0,080***  -0,076***  -0,078*** 
LEVERAGE  -0,060***  -0,075***  -0,031***  -0,060***  -0,075***  -0,031*** 
LEVERAGE*NEGEQ  0,056***  0,063***  0,041***  0,056***  0,063***  0,040*** 
RECBALANCE  -0,049***  -0,056***  -0,032***  -0,049***  -0,056***  -0,032*** 
YOUNG  0,018***  0,023***  0,010  0,018***  0,022***  0,010 
Merger variables             
MERG1t  -0,007***  -0,001  -0,018***  -0,003***  0,003*  -0,013*** 
MERG2t  -0,109***  -  -0,105***  -0,105***  -  -0,106*** 
MERG1t-1  0,003*  0,005**  -0,004  -0,009*  0,011***  0,000 
MERG2t-1  -0,082***  -  -0,080***  -0,079***  -  -0,107*** 
Bank controls             
ln(ASSETB)  -0,021***  -0,015***  -0,027***  -0,020***  -0,015***  -0,025*** 
ROAB  0,642***  1,137***  0,422**  0,404***  0,673***  0,415** 
BADLOANSB  0,922***  1,278***  0,624***  0,730***  0,555***  0,786*** 
OPCOSTB  0,254***  0,287***  0,207**  0,242***  0,312***  0,154*** 
LIQB  -0,028***  0,003**  -0,034***  -0,027***  0,012  -0,038*** 
Merging Bank dummies  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Other variables             
Single rel dummy  -0,038***  -  -  -0,038***  -  -- 
             
DROPPED = 1  77 026  44 669  32 357  77 026  44 669  32 357 
DROPPED = 0  534 485  318 655  215 830  534 485  318 655  215 830 
             
Pseudo R²  5,11%  5,27%  6,05%  5,13%  5,49%  6,31% 
Chi-Square  0,0001  0,0001  0,0001  0,0001  0,0001  0,0001 
 
                                                 
20 The reader may notice that our sample splits (single relationships and multiple relationships) allow 
firms to move from one sample to another sample due to merger related effects. If a firm was 
borrowing from only two banks, both of which were involved in a merger, then the firm automatically 
has a single relationship after the merger (if its lending relationship is not severed). Our results 
however remain robust to using as alternative selection device having single or multiple relationships 
about six months before the merger.  
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Panel A of Table  6 presents the results controlling for bank characteristics, but 
excluding merging bank fixed effects. Panel B includes merging bank fixed effects in 
addition to bank characteristics.
21  Results are broadly consistent across these two 
specifications. All reported coefficients are the marginal effects computed on the basis 
of the regression coefficients.  We discuss first the results for firm and bank control 
variables, then we turn to the merger variables.  
 
The rate of termination of bank lending relationships in our sample is on average 
about 12.6 percent. For comparison, the termination rate in Karceski et al (2004) is 
6.9 percent and only 3 percent in Sapienza (2002). However, Chionsini et al (2004), 
who also use Italian data, find a termination rate of around 11 percent.  
 
Firm controls. For convenience, we base our discussion on the "All" regression with 
merging bank fixed effects of Panel B, Table 6; however, results for all of the other 
regressions are similar. Where there are differences with respect to the other samples, 
we point them out. All of the firm control variables are statistically significant, and all 
of these variables are economically significant with the exception of firm age 
(ln(AGEF)), whose sign also differs for firms with single and multiple relationships. 
The probability of losing a lending relationship decreases with firm size (ASSETF), 
profitability (ROAF), and leverage (LEVERAGE). An increase in the log of firm 
assets by one standard deviation from its mean causes the probability of losing a 
lending relationship to decrease 2.9 percentage points below the average estimated 
probability in the sample of dropping a relationship of 12.6%. This result contrasts 
with results obtained by Sapienza (2002) but is in line with Karceski et al. (2004). Our 
results thus indicate that smaller firms tend to have less stable relationships with their 
banks than do large firms.  
 
As expected, higher firm profitability (ROAF) reduces the likelihood of termination 
of the lending relationship. An increase of ROAF by one standard deviation from its 
mean lowers the probability of dropping the relationship by 2.3 percentage points. 
                                                 
21 Each of these specifications involves some bias. The regression without merging bank fixed effects 
does not control directly for a change in behavior of the merging banks pre and post-merger. On the 
other hand, the regression with merging bank fixed effects can only control for the fixed effects for two 
of the three mergers, as one of the mergers occurred too close to the beginning of our panel to allow us 
to control for the pre-merger behavior of the merging banks.  
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However, firms that are too highly levered (those with negative equity) are more 
likely to lose their relationship. The marginal increase in the probability of losing a 
relationship for firms having a value of NEGEQ equal to one is 5.6%.  This implies 
that f inancially distressed firms have a higher probability of having their lending 
relationship terminated. Similarly, firms which have not yet filed a full-year balance 
sheet (YOUNG=1) and firms which have  halted filing balance sheets 
(RECBALANCE = 0) are both more likely to lose their lending relationships. In sum, 
these results clearly indicate that firm variables are important in explaining 
termination of lending relationships.  
 
Bank controls. All bank control variables are statistically significant in the regressions 
reported in Table  6. The coefficient on ln(ASSETB)  indicates that lending 
relationships tend to have a lower drop rate for larger banks than for smaller banks. 
An increase of ln(ASSETB) by one standard deviation from its mean lowers the 
probability of dropping the relationship by 3.1 percentage points.  
 
This result contrasts with the findings of Berger et al. (2002), who report that in the 
U.S. larger banks tend to have shorter relationships with borrowers than do smaller 
banks. How can these different findings be reconciled? Berger et al. (2002) interpret 
their findings as evidence in favor of small banks being better able to handle soft 
information. Soft information binds a borrower to its bank over time. Since large 
banks in our sample appear to have lower termination rates (and hence presumably 
longer lending relationships with firms), our evidence suggests that large banks in 
Belgium also appear able to deal with soft information. This is also consistent with 
our earlier observation that large Belgian banks are important in lending to SMEs. 
One possible explanation for our empirical result on bank size is that large Belgian 
banks maintain extensive branch networks, which allows for the gathering of soft 
information about small firms.  
 
Bank return on assets (ROAB) in Table 6 appears with a (counterintuitive) positive 
coefficient; however, it does not appear to have a significant economic impact on the 
likelihood of termination of lending relationships. Bank liquidity (LIQB) appears in 
the different regressions with different signs and also is not economically significant. 
The remaining two bank characteristics, BADLOANSB and OPCOSTB, indicate that  
24 
firms borrowing from banks having relatively higher proportions of non-performing 
loans over total loans and larger operating costs over total assets have larger 
termination rates. These results are similar to those reported by Sapienza (2002). 
 
Merger variables. Table 6 suggests that mergers also have significant effects on the 
rate of termination of lending relationships. The coefficients on the "short-run" effects 
MERG1t and MERG2t are generally negative and significant, although the result for 
MERG1t is slightly less consistent across regressions. So for example, in the "All" 
sample with merging bank fixed effects (Panel B), firms borrowing from only one 
merging bank have a probability of losing their relationship in the six months 
following the merger that is lower by 0.3% than for firms borrowing from 
nonmerging banks, and firms borrowing from both merging banks have a probability 
that is 10.5% lower than nonmerging bank borrowers.  
 
These results contrast with those obtained by other studies (e.g., Sapienza, 2002), 
where mergers do not appear to have significant effects in the short run. However, 
these results indicate that firms borrowing from banks involved in mergers (at least 
for the large mergers under consideration) were less likely than firms borrowing from 
nonmerging banks to lose their lending relationship. On the one hand, this result 
might suggest that the mergers under investigation were beneficial to firm borrowers 
(e.g., because efficiency effects of mergers dominated market power effects). On the 
other hand, this result is also consistent with the idea that the ultimate effects of 
mergers take time to be realized. The merged bank may decide to hold constant the 
lending policies of the merging banks for some period following the merger, before 
implementing the policy for the consolidated bank. For example, local branch 
managers may invest  (even more) in the gathering of “soft” information, as branch 
closure decisions are not spelled out yet. 
 
Support for the interpretation that merger effects are realized over time is given by the 
longer run merger effects (those occurring between six and eighteen months following 
the merger), which are reflected by the coefficients on MERG1t-1 and MERG2t-1. 
The coefficient on MERG1t-1 is positive and significant for firms with single lending 
relationships (the single relationship sample). The sign of the coefficient on MERG1t-
1 for the entire sample depends on whether we control for merging bank fixed effects.  
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On the other hand, the coefficient on MERG2t-1 is negative and significant for all 
regressions. These results again suggest that mergers have effects, but the effects may 
differ for borrowers that were borrowing from only one of the merging banks versus 
those that were borrowing from two of the merging banks prior to the merger 
(consistent with Hypothesis 2d). Firms with single relationships borrowing from only 
one of the merging banks appear more likely to lose their relationships following the 
merger; however, firms borrowing from both of the merging banks are significantly 
less likely to lose their relationships than firms borrowing from nonmerging banks, 
and this effect is very strong.  
 
As a point of comparison, Sapienza (2002) also finds significant merger effects; firms 
borrowing from merging banks have a probability of losing their relationship that is 
higher by 1.3% than for nonmerging bank borrowers. Most of this effect, however, 
seems to occur about four quarters after the merger. Sapienza does not distinguish 
between firms borrowing from only one versus two or more of the banks involved in a 
merger.  
 
IV.2 Target versus acquiring bank borrowers 
 
Given that merger effects appear to differ for firms borrowing from only one versus 
two merging banks, are the effects different for firms borrowing from the target and 
from the  acquiring bank (Hypothesis 2a)? Table  7 reports the results of the 
regressions that address this question. We have replaced the merger variable MERG1t 
from the earlier regressions with two variables ACQUIREt and TARGETt, 
representing the short run merger effects for firms borrowing only from an acquirer 
bank or only from a target bank, respectively. Instead of the variable MERG2t, we 
now include the variable ACQTARGt, which represents firms that were borrowing 
from both the acquiring bank and at least one target bank. Similar variables, with t-1 
subscripts, are defined to capture the longer run effects. Because the coefficients for 
the firm and bank controls are similar to those reported in Table 6, we report here and 
in all subsequent tables only the marginal effects for the merger variables. 
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Table 7: Panel regressions: target versus acquirer banks 
The dependent variable in each regression equals one if during the following year firm i loses its relationship with 
bank k. The reported coefficients are logit estimates of a marginal change in the independent variable on the 
probability of losing the lending relationship. All regressions include a constant term, firm industry dummies, and 
year dummies (not reported). Definitions of the variables are provided in Section III. *, **, *** denotes 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1%-level, respectively (based on heteroskedastic-robust standard errors). 
 
 
PANEL  A 
Without merging bank fixed effects 
B 
With merging bank fixed effects 
  Sample  Sample 
  All   Single rel.  Multiple rels  All  Single rels.  Multiple rels 
             
ACQUIREt  -0,016***  -0,007***  -0,030***  -0,011***  -0,005**  -0,022*** 
TARGETt  0,016***  0,018***  0,020***  0,015***  0,023***  0,007 
ACQTARGt  -0,104***    -0,109***  -0,103***  -  -0,106*** 
ACQUIREt-1  -0,026***  -0,024***  -0,032***  -0,021***  -0,020***  -0,024*** 
TARGETt-1  0,071***  0,066***  0,077***  0,074***  0,075***  0,063*** 
ACQTARGt-1  -0,084***  -  -0,082***  -0,070***  -  -0,095*** 
Firm controls included  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Bank controls included  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
 
 
We again base our discussion on Panel B. In terms of the short-run merger effects, an 
interesting heterogeneity between borrowers from acquiring and target banks now 
appears. For example, the results for the “ All” sample indicate that borrowers of 
acquiring banks have a lower likelihood (-1.1 %) of losing their relationships than 
borrowers of nonmerging banks, while borrowers of target banks have a  greater 
likelihood (+1.5%) of being dropped (an exception to the latter result is the multiple-
relationship regression in the panel B sample where the coefficient is not significant). 
Firms borrowing from both the acquiring and a target bank have a lower probability 
(-10.3%) of losing their relationship than firms borrowing from nonmerging banks.  
 
The longer run marginal effects of mergers provide further support for these results 
and appear to be more robust. Firms borrowing from an acquiring bank have a lower 
probability ( -2.1%) of losing their relationship during the six to eighteen months 
following  mergers than borrowers of nonmerging banks. Firms borrowing from a 
target bank have a higher probability (+7.4%) of losing their relationship than 
otherwise identical firms not borrowing from the target bank.  
 
These results suggest, in line with Hypothesis 2a, that it is important to distinguish 
borrowers of target banks from borrowers of acquiring banks. Indeed, the result from 
Table 6 suggesting that borrowers of only one of the merging banks may be more  
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likely to lose their relationship in the longer run does not tell the whole story. 
Borrowers of acquiring banks have a lower probability of losing their relationship 
with the consolidated bank, while borrowers of target banks have a higher probability 
of losing the relationship with the consolidated bank.  
 
These results are also consistent with findings of Sapienza (2002) and Karceski et al. 
(2004), who report that borrowers from target banks in Italy and Norway, 
respectively, are more likely to lose their relationship. In contrast, however, neither of 
these studies finds the rate of termination of bank lending relationships for borrowers 
of acquiring banks to be much different from the rate for borrowers of nonmerging 
banks. In addition, both Sapienza (2002) and Karceski et al (2004) find the effects of 
mergers on target bank borrowers to be stronger for small than for large target banks. 
Although all of our mergers involve large target banks (and one merger involves a 
large and a medium-size target bank), we nevertheless observe strong effects of 
mergers on borrowers of target banks. We also find that mergers have immediate 
effects, although the effects are more robust in the longer run.  
 
Finally, neither of the above studies treats separately firms borrowing from both the 
acquiring and target bank in a merger. Our results suggest that borrowing from both 
banks prior to a merger results in a significantly lower probability of loss of 
relationship than borrowing from a single merging bank, in line with Hypothesis 2d.  
 
IV.3 Mergers and firm size  
 
Are small borrowers affected differently than large borrowers by bank mergers? We 
address this combination of Hypotheses 2a,b and c in Table 8, which reports the 
results of the interactions of firm size with the merger variables separately for target 
and acquiring bank borrowers.
22 
 
                                                 
22 We have also run similar regression interacting the merger variables with firm profitability; however, 
we obtained no significant results.   
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Table 8: Panel regressions: interaction with firm size for acquirer and target 
banks 
 
The dependent variable in each regression equals one if during the following year firm i loses its relationship with 
bank k. The reported coefficients are logit estimates of a marginal change in the independent variable on the 
probability of losing the lending relationship. All regressions include a constant term, firm industry dummies, and 
year dummies (not reported). Definitions of the variables are provided in Section III. *, **, *** denotes 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1%-level, respectively (based on heteroskedastic-robust standard errors). 
 
 
  With merging bank fixed effects 




rels.  Multiple rels 
       
ACQUIREt  0,123***  0,043*  0,058* 
TARGETt  -0,122***  -0,186**  -0,139*** 
ACQTARGt  -0,429***  -  -0,361*** 
ACQUIREt-1  0,128***  0,032  0,180*** 
TARGETt-1  0,029  -0,135***  0,159*** 
ACQTARGt-1  -0,316***  -0,216  -0,377** 
ACQUIREt * ln(ASSETF)  -0,010***  -0,004**  -0,006** 
TARGETt * ln(ASSETF)  0,011***  0,017***  0,011*** 
ACQTARGt *ln(ASSETF)  0,023***  -  0,018*** 
ACQUIREt-1 * ln(ASSETF)  -0,011***  -0,004*  -0,015** 
TARGETt-1 * ln(ASSETF)  0,004*  0,017***  -0,007*** 
ACQTARGt-1*ln(ASSETF)  0,018**  0,011  0,019 
Firm controls  yes  yes  yes 
Bank controls  yes  yes  yes 
Bank dummies  yes  yes  yes 
 
The differing relative effects of mergers on firms of differing sizes are reflected by the 
interaction of the merger variables with ACQUIRE*ASSETF. Interestingly, however, 
the sign of the total merger effect, as given by the sum of the merger variable and the 
interaction term (e.g.,  ACQUIRE  +  ACQUIRE*ASSETF), now differs in certain 
regressions for small and large firms.
23 Because results differ according to the time 
period following the merger and according to the number of relationships (single vs. 
multiple) maintained by borrowers, we differentiate these cases in the discussion. 
 
Acquiring banks and firm size. The interaction terms ACQUIREt*ASSETF for the 
short run indicate that large firms with single and multiple relationships are favoured 
by acquiring banks: large firms borrowing from the acquiring bank have a lower 
                                                 
23 The coefficients on the noninteracted merger variables must now be interpreted as reflecting the 
effect of a merger for a firm with a zero value of assets. Despite the fact that some of the coefficients 
on these merger variables have changed signs relative to the regressions reported in Table 7, the  
estimated total marginal effects of mergers (as reflected by e.g., ACQUIRE + ACQUIRE*ASSETF) 
are the same as those implied by the coefficients in Table 8.  
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probability than small firms of having their lending relationships terminated. The long 
run interaction of size and the acquiring bank variable is in line with the short run 
effects. In terms of the total merger effect for acquiring borrowers (given by 
ACQUIRE  +  ACQUIRE*ASSETF), in the short run small firms borrowing from 
acquiring banks have a higher probability of losing their relationship than nonmerging 
bank borrowers, while firms that are large enough have a lower probability. In the 
long run, smaller firms with multiple relationships borrowing from acquiring banks 
have a higher probability than nonmerging borrowers of losing their relationship, and 
large firms have a lower probability.  
 
Target banks and firm size. In the short run, large borrowers of target banks have a 
higher probability than small borrowers of losing their relationship with the merged 
bank. This difference also holds in the long run for single relationship firms; however, 
for firms with multiple relationships, smaller borrowers of target banks are more 
likely than large borrowers to lose their relationship with the merged bank than larger 
borrowers at target banks.  
 
The result that larger borrowers are more likely to maintain their relationships at 
acquiring banks is consistent with the hypothesis that mergers gives banks a greater 
comparative advantage in lending to large firms. However, the results for target bank 
borrowers are not consistent with this hypothesis. Namely, in the short run large 
borrowers of target banks have a higher probability than small borrowers of losing 
their relationship. One possible interpretation of the results for target borrowers is that 
larger firms and firms with multiple relationships have more alternative sources of 
finance than smaller, single relationship firms and, hence, lower switching costs. In 
the short run, borrowers of target banks with the lowest switching costs switch from 
the target bank (which may be required to adopt the credit policies of the acquirer) to 
other sources of finance. Borrower-initiated switching may be an important factor 
behind the higher relationship drop rate for borrowers of target banks in the short run, 
whereas bank-initiated terminations may become the driving force in the longer run. 
Indeed, Karceski et al (2004) report results that suggest that borrowers of target banks 
with lower estimated switching costs suffer less of a negative abnormal return from 
mergers than borrowers with higher switching costs. Larger firms and firms with 
multiple relationships are considered by Karceski et al. to have lower switching costs.   
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IV.4 Individual merger regressions 
 
As a check on the panel regression results, we also run regressions for each individual 
merger (using the same sample of firms as for the panel regressions), and we run 
separate regressions for the short-run and long-run effects.
24  Table  9 presents the 
results of the test for the effects of mergers on firms borrowing from merging banks 
versus nonmerging banks. This table reports the number of mergers for which the 
coefficients on the different merger variables were statistically significant and of a 
given sign.  Because the firm and bank control variables yield results for each merger 
that are similar to those reported in Table 6 for the panel regressions, we report here 
only the results for the merger variables. 
 
Table 9: Individual merger regressions: impact on lending relationships  
 
The dependent variable in each regression equals one if during the following 
year firm i loses its relationship with bank k. Numbers in each cell give 
the number of mergers for which the variable was statistically 
significant with a particular sign.  
 
    Sample 








Short run effects         
MERG1t   -  2  3  2 
  +      1 
MERG2t  -  3  -  3 
  +       
Long run effects         
MERG1t-1  -  1  1
*  2 
  +  1  1   
MERG2t-1  -  2  -  3 
  +       
* Significant at 10% level. 
 
Table 9 provides support for the result that firms borrowing from merging banks have 
lower probabilities in the short run of losing their relationship. This result also appears 
to hold in the long run, although the coefficient for MERG1t becomes significantly 
positive for the multiple relationship sample for one merger. 
 
                                                 
24 These regressions are more comparable to our panel regressions without bank fixed effects than with.  
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Table 1 0 reports the results of the individual merger regressions for target and 
acquirer bank borrowers. This table reveals some heterogeneity in the short run 
effects of mergers; however, the long run effects  provide stronger support for the 
results reported in the panel regressions. The differing effects of mergers on acquiring 
and target borrowers appear to be more consistent across individual mergers for firms 
with multiple relationships than for firms with single relationships. 
 
Table 10: Individual merger regressions: acquirer and target effects  
 
The dependent variable in each regression equals one if during the following 
year firm i loses its relationship with bank k. Numbers in each cell give 
the number of mergers for which the variable was statistically 
significant with a particular sign.  
 
    Sample 








Short run effects         
ACQUIREt   -  3  3  2 
  +      1 
TARGETt  -    2   
  +  1  1  2 
ACQTARGt  -  3  -  3 
  +    -   
Long run effects         
ACQUIREt-1   -  2  2  3
* 
  +       
TARGETt-1  -    1   
  +  1  2
*  2 
ACQTARGt-1  -  2  -  3 
  +       
* One regression significant at 10% level; others significant 




This paper studies the impact of bank consolidation on bank lending relationships of 
small and medium size firms, using information from individual loan contracts in 
Belgium. We estimate the effect of bank mergers on borrowers' ability to maintain 
their bank relationships and to continue to tap bank credit. The paper represents one 
of a very small number of papers relying on firm-level data to study the effects of 
bank mergers. In addition, it considers mergers in an environment with a number of 
features that have not been present in other studies but are typical for a number of 
countries. 
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Our results indicate that mergers have effects in the short run as well as the longer 
run. When we distinguish between firms borrowing from merging banks and those 
borrowing from nonmerging banks,  we find that merging bank borrowers are 
significantly less likely to see their lending relationship terminated than nonmerging 
bank  borrowers following a merger. When we distinguish between borrowers of 
acquiring and target banks, we find that borrowers at target banks are more likely to 
see their relationship terminated, whereas borrowers of acquiring banks are less likely 
to have their relationship dropped following a merger. These differential effects begin 
appearing even in the short run, but they become more robust in the longer run. In 
addition, our results on acquiring bank borrowers appear to be stronger than those 
reported in empirical work for other countries.  
 
Similar to other studies, w e find heterogeneous effects of bank mergers for large 
versus small firms. The effects, however, also differ for large firms borrowing from 
acquiring banks compared with large firms borrowing from target banks, and  for 
target bank borrowers with single versus multiple lending relationships. Whereas 
large borrowers are favored by acquiring banks, large borrowers of target banks are 
more likely in the short run to have their lending relationship severed.  
 
One possible interpretation of the results for target borrowers (and a focus of our 
ongoing work) is that borrowers of target banks with low switching costs, including 
some large borrowers with multiple lending relationships, may voluntarily switch 
banks immediately following the merger. Borrowers with high switching costs are 
more inclined to stay with the merging bank. Examination of changes in loan volumes 
for target borrowers with multiple relationships should enable us to determine if these 
borrowers compensate for the severed relationship with the merged bank by 
borrowing more from the other banks with which a relationship already exists. 
 
Because switching costs are likely to be higher for borrowers with single relationships 
than for borrowers with multiple relationships, we run separate regressions for firms 
with single and with multiple relationships, in addition to running regressions for all 
firms taken together.  Although results for these two groups are similar,  a few 
differences appear, such as those for target borrowers noted above. Another difference 
emerges in the effect of firm age on the probability of dropping a lending relationship.  
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Younger firms with single relationships have more stable lending relationships than 
older firms, whereas  younger firms with multiple relationships have less stable 
lending relationships than older firms. Finally, at the level of merging bank versus 
nonmerging bank borrowers, single relationship borrowers of merging banks have a 
higher probability in the longer run of losing their relationships with the merged bank 
than do borrowers of nonmerging banks. In contrast, multiple relationship borrowers 
have a lower probability of losing their relationship with the merged bank.  
 
Finally, we find that firms borrowing from two of the merging banks are less likely to 
lose their relationship with the consolidated bank than are firms borrowing from only 
one of the merging banks or firms borrowing from nonmerging banks. One might ask 
whether this result simply reflects the relationship with the acquiring bank, which also 
would imply that the firm has a lower probability of losing the relationship. The effect 
for borrowers of both acquiring and target banks, however, is much stronger than that 
for acquiring bank borrowers only. This suggests that informational gains arise from 
the pooling of information of the merging banks that may not appear when only one 
of the merging banks was previously lending to the firm. 
 
Although we have shown that mergers have significant effects on the rate of 
termination of lending relationships with SMEs, we have not yet been able to 
investigate the extent to which borrowers continuing on with the merged bank may 
benefit from or be harmed by the merger. Ideally, we would need data on interest 
rates in order to study these effects. While the Belgian credit register data do not 
contain interest rates, we do have information on loan volumes, from which we may 
be able to make some inferences about loan terms. Part of our ongoing work involves 
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Firm control variables   
AGEF  Age of the firm in years 
ASSETF  Total book value of assets of the firm, expressed in 2002 € 
ROAF  EBIT over assets 
LEVERAGE  Book value of debt over assets 
NEGEQ  Dummy that takes value 1 if firm has negative equity 
RECBALANCE  Dummy that takes value 1 for firms with balance sheet 
available in at least one of the two years prior to year in 
which credit was granted 
YOUNG  Dummy that takes value 1 for firms younger than 3 years and 
whose balance sheet covers less than 12 months of data 
   
Bank control variables   
ASSETB  Total assets of the bank, expressed in 2002€ 
ROAB  Total return on assets 
BADLOANSB  Non-performing loans over total loans 
OPCOSTB  Operating costs over total assets 
LIQB  (Cash + net position in the interbank market + short term 
securities' portfolio + government bonds) over assets 
   
Merger variables   
MERG1kt  Dummy =1 if firm borrowing from bank k which was 
involved in a merger occurring during 12 months following 
time t and if firm not borrowing from any of the other 
merging banks 
MERG2kt  Dummy =1 if firm borrowing from bank k which was 
involved in a merger occurring during 12 months following 
time t and if firm borrowing from at least one of the other 
merging banks 
ACQUIREkt  Dummy =1 if firm borrowing from bank k which was the 
acquiring bank in a merger occurring during 12 months 
following time t and if firm not borrowing from any of the 
other merging banks 
TARGETkt  Dummy =1  if firm borrowing from bank k which was a 
target bank in a merger occurring during 12 months 
following time t and if firm not borrowing from any of the 
other merging banks 
ACQTARGkt  Dummy =1  if firm borrowing from bank k which was 
involved in a merger occurring during 12 months following 
time t and if firm was borrowing from the acquiring and a 
target bank 
MERG1k,t-1  Dummy =1 if firm borrowing from bank k which was 
involved in a merger occurring between time t-1 and t and if 
firm not borrowing from any of the other merging banks 
MERG2k,t-1  Dummy =1 if firm borrowing from bank k which involved in 
a merger occurring between time t-1 and t and if firm was 
borrowing from at least one of the other merging banks 
ACQUIREk,t-1  Dummy =1 if firm borrowing from bank k which was the 
acquiring bank in a merger occurring between time t-1 and t  
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and if firm not borrowing from any of the other merging 
banks 
TARGETk,t-1  Dummy =1 if firm borrowing from bank k and bank k was a 
target bank in a merger occurring between time t-1 and t and 
if firm was not borrowing from any of the other merging 
banks 
ACQTARGt-1  Dummy =1 if firm borrowing from bank k which was 
involved in a merger occurring between time t-1 and t and if 
firm was borrowing from both the acquirer and a target bank 
   
Other variables   
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